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Abstract. Certiﬁcateless Public Key Cryptography was ﬁrst introduced
by Al-Riyami and Paterson in order to eliminate the inherent key-escrow
problem of Identity-Based Cryptography. In this paper, we present a
new practical construction of certiﬁcateless public key encryption scheme
without paring. Our scheme is, in the random oracle model, provably
secure under the assumption that the RSA problem is intractable.
Keywords: Certiﬁcateless public key encryption, RSA.
1 Introduction
In order to solve the key escrow problem that is inherent in identity-based cryp-
tography (IBC) [20], while at the same time, eliminate the use of certiﬁcates
in the traditional public key cryptography (PKC), Al-Riyami and Paterson [1]
introduced the concept of certiﬁcateless public key cryptography (CL-PKC). Dif-
ferent from IBC, a user’s public key in CL-PKC is no longer an arbitrary string;
instead, the public key is generated by the user based the user’s secret infor-
mation as well as a partial private key obtained from a trusted authority called
Key Generation Center (KGC). As such, public keys in CL-PKC do not need to
be explicitly certiﬁed. Note here that the KGC does not know the user’s private
keys since they contain secret information generated by the users themselves,
thereby removing the escrow problem in IBC.
Since the introduction of CL-PKC [1], many concrete constructions of cer-
tiﬁcateless public key encryption (CL-PKE) schemes have been proposed. The
schemes in [3,6,21,22] were proven secure in the random oracle model [4] while
the schemes in [14] and [18] are secure without the random oracles.
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There were also eﬀorts to construct generic CL-PKC schemes. The ﬁrst generic
CL-PKE scheme was proposed in [23] and was later shown in [16] to be inse-
cure under the model of [1]. In [5], the authors extended the concept of key
encapsulation mechanism to IBE and CL-PKE, and built generic constructions
of identity-based key encapsulation mechanism and certiﬁcateless public key en-
capsulation mechanism.
One notable feature in the research of CL-PKE has been the development
of a number of alternative security models that are substantially weaker than
the original model of [1]. These diﬀerent models are summarized by Dent [7].
Moreover, Dent et al. [8] presents a generic construction as well as a concrete con-
struction for certiﬁcateless encryption schemes that are provably secure against
strong adversaries in the standard model.
Au et al. [2] pointed out the weakness of the previous security models and
analyzed some previous schemes under an enhanced malicious KGC model. They
showed that the CL-PKE scheme in [16] is secure against malicious KGC attacks
under random oracle assumption. Hwang and Liu [13] proposed a new CL-PKE
scheme which is secure against malicious KGC attacks. Its security is proven
in the standard model. In addition, Huang and Wong [12] proposed a generic
construction of certiﬁcateless encryption which is proven secure against malicious
KGC attacks in the standard model.
Other Related Work. Gentry [10] introduced a diﬀerent but related concept
named certiﬁcate based encryption (CBE). This approach is closer to the context
of a traditional PKI model as it involves a certiﬁcation authority (CA) providing
an implicit certiﬁcation service for clients’ public keys. Liu et al. proposed the
ﬁrst self-generated-certiﬁcate public key encryption (SGC-PKE) scheme in [14],
which defends the DoD attack that exists in CL-PKE. Lai and Kou [15] proposed
a SGC-PKE scheme without using pairing.
Contribution. In spite of the recent advances in implementation technique, the
paring computation is still considered as expensive compared with the “stan-
dard” operations such as modular exponentiations in ﬁnite ﬁelds. Baek et al. [3]
proposed the ﬁrst CL-PKE scheme without pairing, which was related to the
early works on the self-certiﬁed keys [11,19].
In this paper, inspired by the identity-based key agreement protocol proposed
by Okamoto and Tanaka [17] and whose security relies on the RSA problem, we
present a new CL-PKE scheme without paring. Due to the extensive deployment
of RSA, our scheme is better oﬀ in compatibility with the existing cryptosystems.
In addition, in [3], the Type I adversary is not allowed to replace the challenge
identity’s public key, which is the main attacking means of Type I adversary.
Compared with the scheme in [3], our scheme does not have this limitation.
Organization. The rest of the paper is organized as follow. We give some related
deﬁnitions in Section 2. The model of CL-PKE is also reviewed in this section.
The proposed CL-PKE scheme and its security analysis is presented in Section
3. Finally concluding remarks are given in Section 4.
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 Computational Problems
Definition 1. The RSA problem is, given a randomly generated RSA modulus
n, an exponent e and a random z, to ﬁnd y ∈ Z∗n such that ye = z.
Definition 2. The Computational Diﬃe-Hellman (CDH) problem in Z∗n is,
given p,q,n (where p = 2p′+1, q = 2q′+1, n = pq with p′, q′ being two equal-length
large primes), g ∈ Z∗n of order p′q′, ga and gb for uniformly chosen a, b ∈ Z∗n, to
compute gab.
2.2 Certificateless Public Key Encryption
A generic CL-PKE is a tuple of algorithm described as follows [3]:
Setup: Takes as input a security parameter κ and outputs a common parameter
params and a master secret msk.
PartialKeyExtract: Takes as input params, msk and an identity ID. It outputs a
partial private key dID.
SetSecretValue: Takes as input params and an identity ID. It outputs a secret
value sID.
SetPrivateKey: Takes as input params, dID and sID. It outputs a private key
SKID.
SetPublicKey: Takes as input params, dID and sID. It outputs a public key PKID.
Enc: Takes as input params, a message m, a receiver’s identity ID and PKID. It
outputs a ciphertext c.
Dec: Takes as input params, SKID and a ciphertext c. It outputs a message m
or the failure symbol ⊥.
We insist that CL-PKE satisﬁes the obvious correctness requirement that de-
capsulation “undoes” encapsulation.
Note that, the above model of CL-PKE is slightly weaker than the original
one given in [1] as a user must authenticate herself to the KGC in order to obtain
a partial private key to create a public key, while the original CL-PKE model
does not require a user to contact the KGC to setup her public keys. However,
as argued in [3], this modiﬁed model preserves the unique property of CL-PKE
that no certiﬁcates are required in order to guarantee the authenticity of public
keys, which is the main motivation of CL-PKE.
Security Model. There are two types of adversaries [1]. Type I adversary models
an “outsider” adversary, who does not have the KGC’s master secret key but
it can replace public keys of arbitrary identities with other public keys of its
own choices. It can also obtain partial and full secret keys of arbitrary identities.
Type II adversary models an “honest-but-curious” KGC, who knows the master
secret key (hence it can compute partial secret key by itself). It is still allowed to
obtain full secret key for arbitrary identities but is not allowed to replace public
keys at any time.
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Security in CL-PKE is deﬁned using the following game between an attack
algorithm A and a challenger.
Setup. The challenger runs the Setup algorithm and gives A the resulting
system parameter params. If A is of Type I, the challenger keeps the master
secret key msk to itself; otherwise, it gives msk to A.
Query phase 1 The adversary A adaptively issues the following queries:
– Public-Key-Request query: On input an identity ID, the challenger
runs SetPublicKey(params, dID, sID), where the partial private key dID
and the secret value sID of the identity ID are obtained from PartialKeyEx-
tract and SetSecretValue, respectively, and forwards the result to the ad-
versary.
– Partial-Key-Extract query: On input an identity ID, the challenger
runs PartialKeyExtract(params,msk, ID) and returns the result to A.
Note that it is only useful to Type I adversary.
– Private-Key-Request query: On input an identity ID, the challenger
runs SetPrivateKey(params, dID, sID), where the partial private key dID
and the secret value sID of the identity ID are obtained from PartialKeyEx-
tract and SetSecretValue, respectively, and forwards the result to the ad-
versary. It outputs ⊥ if the uesr’s public key has been replaced in the
case of Type I adversary.
– Public-Key-Replace query (for Type I adversary only): On input an
identity and a valid public key, it replaces the associated user’s public
key with the new one.
– Dec query: On input a ciphertext and an identity, returns the decrypted
message using the private key corresponding to the current value of the
public key associated with the identity of the user.
Challenge query: After making a polynomial number of queries, A outputs
two messages m0,m1 and an identity ID∗. The challenger picks a random bit
β ∈ {0, 1}, sets c∗ = Enc(parmas,mβ , ID∗,PKID∗) and sends c∗ to A.
Query phase 2 A makes a new sequence of queries.
Guess A outputs a bit β′ . It wins the game if β′ = β under the following
conditions:
– At any time, ID∗ has not been submitted to the Private-Key-Request
query.
– (c∗, ID∗,PKID∗) have not been submitted to the Dec query.
– If it is Type I adversary, ID∗ cannot be equal to an identity for which
both the public key has been replaced and the partial private key has
been extracted.
We deﬁne A’s advantage in attacking the certiﬁcateless public key encryption
CL-PKE as
AdvCL-PKEA = |Pr[β = β
′
]− 1
2
|.
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Definition 3. We say that a certiﬁcateless public key encryption CL-PKE is
(t, qpub, qpar, qprv, qd, )-IND-CCA secure against Type I (resp. Type II) adver-
sary AI (resp. AII), if for all t-time algorithms AI (resp. AII) making at most
qpub Public-Key-Request queries, qpar Partial-Key-Extract queries, qprv
Private-Key-Request queries and qd Dec queries, have advantage at most 
in winning the above game.
IND-CPA security is deﬁned similarly, but with the restriction that the adversary
cannot make Dec queries.
Definition 4. We say that a certiﬁcateless public key encryption CL-PKE is
(t, qpub, qpar, qprv, )-IND-CPA secure, if it is (t, qpub, qpar, qprv, 0, )-IND-CCA se-
cure.
3 Our Scheme
Our CL-PKE scheme is inspired by the RSA-based key agreement protocol [17]
introduced by Okamoto and Tanaka. We ﬁrst present our scheme and then show
that it is IND-CPA secure. However, it is easy to turn our IND-CPA secure CL-
PKE scheme into an IND-CCA secure CL-PKE scheme using the technique pro-
posed by Fujisaki and Okamoto [9], as did in [3].
Setup(κ) Given a security parameter κ, a RSA group < n, p, q, e, d, g > is gen-
erated, where p′, q′ are κ-bit prime numbers, p = 2p′ + 1, q = 2q′ + 1, n =
pq, e < φ(n), gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1, ed ≡ 1(mod φ(n)), and φ denotes the Euler
totient function. Chooses two cryptographic hash functions H : {0, 1}∗ →
Z
∗
n, H2 : Z∗n → {0, 1}l, where l is the length of the plaintext message.
The master secret key is deﬁned as msk = d. The common parameter is
params = (n, e,H,H2).
PartialKeyExtract(params,msk, ID) Given params, msk = d and an identity
ID ∈ {0, 1}∗, outputs the partial private key
dID = H(ID)d.
SetSecretValue(params, ID) Given params and an identity ID, randomly chooses
xID ∈ Z∗n and outputs
sID = xID.
SetPrivateKey(params, dID, sID) Given params, the partial private key dID and
the secret value sID = xID of an identity ID, outputs
SKID = xID.
SetPublicKey(params, dID, sID) Given params, the partial private key dID =
H(ID)d and the secret value sID = xID of an identity ID, outputs
PKID = H(ID)d+xID .
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Enc(params,m, ID,PKID) Given params, a message m and the public key PKID
of an identity ID, randomly chooses r ∈ Z∗n and computes
c1 = H(ID)er, c2 = H2(PKIDerH(ID)−r)⊕m,
then outputs c = (c1, c2).
Dec(params, SKID, c) Given params, the private key SKID of an identity ID, and
a ciphertext c = (c1, c2), outputs
m = H2(cSKID1 )⊕ c2.
It can be easily seen that the above decryption algorithm is consistent, i. e.,
PKID
erH(ID)−r = H(ID)(d+xID)erH(ID)−r
= H(ID)rH(ID)erxIDH(ID)−r
= cxID1 = c
SKID
1 .
We now prove the security of the scheme by two theorems.
Theorem 1. Assume the hash functions H,H2 are random oracles and
the RSA problem is (t, )-intractable. Then, the above CL-PKE scheme is
(t′, qpub, qpar, qprv, ′)IND-CPA secure against Type I adversary AI for
t > t′ + tex(qH + qpub),  >
2′
qH2τ(qpar + qprv + 1)
,
where tex denotes the time for computing exponentiation in Z∗n, τ denotes the
base of the natural logarithm and qH (resp. qH2) denotes the number of H (resp.
H2) queries by the adversary.
Proof. Let AI be a Type I adversary that (t′, qpub, qpar, qprv, ′)-breaks the IND-
CPA security of the certiﬁcateless public key encryption scheme described above.
We construct an algorithm B, that solves the RSA problem, as follows. B is given
an instance of the RSA problem, which consists of (n, e, z). B’s goal is to ﬁnd
y ∈ Z∗n such that ye = z. It interacts with AI as follows.
Setup B maintains three lists H-List,H2-List and KeyList. Initially the lists are
empty. The common parameter params = (n, e) is sent to AI . The master
secret key msk = d, where ed ≡ 1(mod φ(n)), is unknown to B.
Query phase 1 AI adaptively issues H, H2, Public-Key-Request, Partial-
Key-Extract, Private-Key-Request and Public-Key-Replace queries.
B answers them as follows:
– H query on ID: If a record (ID, hID, fID, coin) appears in the H-List, sends
hID to AI ; otherwise, B picks coin ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr[coin =
0] = ρ. (ρ will be determined later.) Then, randomly chooses fID ∈ Z∗n.
Finally, the record (ID, hID = zcoin · feID, fID, coin) is added to the H-List
and hID is sent to AI .
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– H2 query on ω: If a record (ω, k) appears in the H2-List, sends k to AI ;
otherwise, picks k ∈ {0, 1}l at random, adds the record (ω, k) to H2-List
and sends k to AI .
– Public-Key-Request query on ID: Randomly chooses xID ∈ Z∗n and
searches H-List for a record (ID, hID, fID, coin). Then, adds the record
(ID,PKID = fIDhxIDID , SKID = xID, coin) to KeyList and sends PKID to AI .
– Partial-Key-Extract query on ID: Searches H-List for a record (ID, hID,
fID, coin). If coin = 0, sends fID to AI ; otherwise, aborts and terminates.
– Private-Key-Extract query on ID: Searches KeyList for a record (ID,
PKID, SKID, coin). If coin = 0, sends SKID to AI ; otherwise, aborts and
terminates.
– Public-Key-Replace query on (ID,PK′ID): Replaces PKID with PK
′
ID.
Challenge AI submits two messages m0,m1 and an identity ID∗ with the public
key PKID∗ . B searches H-List for a record (ID∗, hID∗ , fID∗ , coin). If coin = 0, it
aborts and terminates; otherwise, B picks r ∈ Z∗n at random. Let r∗ = d+ r,
which is unknown to B. Then B randomly chooses c∗2 ∈ {0, 1}l and computes
c∗1 = H(ID
∗)er
∗
= H(ID∗)e(d+r) = h1+erID∗ .
Finally, it sends c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2) to AI .
Query phase 2 AI makes a new sequence of queries, and B responds as in
Query phase 1.
Guess: Finally, the adversary AI outputs a bit β′. B picks a tuple (ω, k) from
H2-List at random and outputs
PK1+er
ID∗
ωhr
ID∗fID∗
as the solution to the RSA problem.
Probability Analysis: Let AskH∗2 denotes the event that PK
er∗
ID∗H(ID
∗)−r
∗
has
been queried to H2. Note that,
PKer
∗
ID∗H(ID
∗)−r
∗
= PKe(d+r)ID∗ H(ID
∗)−d−r
= PK1+erID∗ h
−d
ID∗h
−r
ID∗
= PK1+erID∗ (zf
e
ID∗)
−dh−rID∗
= PK1+erID∗ z
−df−1ID∗h
−r
ID∗ .
If the event AskH∗2 happens, then B will be able to solve the RSA problem by
choosing a tuple (ω, k) from the H2-List and computing
PK1+er
ID∗
ωhr
ID∗fID∗
with the prob-
ability at least 1qH2 , where qH2 is the number of H2 queries by the adversary. If
the event AskH∗2 does not happen, B’s simulations are perfect and are identically
distributed as the real one from the construction.
We observe that the probability that B does not abort during the simulation
is given by ρqpar+qprv (1− ρ) which is maximized at ρ = 1− 1/(qpar + qprv + 1).
Hence the probability that B does not abort is at most 1τ(qpar+qprv+1) , where τ
denotes the base of the natural logarithm.
Now, the event AskH∗2|¬Abort denoted by Good, where Abort denotes the event
that B aborts during the simulation. If Good dose not happen, it is clear that
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the adversary does not gain any advantage greater than 1/2 to guess β. Namely,
we have Pr[β′ = β|¬Good] ≤ 1/2. Hence, by splitting Pr[β′ = β], we obtain
|Pr[β′ = β]− 12 | ≤ 12Pr[Good]. To sum up, we have  > 2
′
qH2 τ(qpar+qprv+1)
.
Time Complexity. In the simulation, B’s overhead is dominated by the ex-
ponentiation computation in response to AI ’s H and Public-Key-Request
queries. So, we have t > t′ + tex(qH + qpub), where tex denotes the time for
computing exponentiation in Z∗n.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 1.
Theorem 2. Assume the hash functions H and H2 are random oracles and the
CDH problem is (t, )-intractable. Then, the above CL-PKE scheme is (t′, qpub,
qpar, qprv, 
′)IND-CPA secure against Type II adversary AII for
t > t′ + tex(qH + qpub),  >
2′
qH2τ(qprv + 1)
,
where tex denotes the time for computing exponentiation in Z∗n, τ denotes the
base of the natural logarithm and qH (resp. qH2) denotes the number of H (resp.
H2) queries by the adversary.
Proof. Let AII be a Type II adversary that (t′, qpub, qpar, qprv, ′)-breaks the
IND-CPA security of the CL-PKE scheme described above. We construct an
algorithm B, that solves the CDH problem, as follows. B is given an instance
of the CDH problem, which consists of (n, p, q, g, ga, gb). B’s goal is to compute
gab. It interacts with AII as follows.
Setup B maintains three lists H-List, H2-List and KeyList. Initially the lists are
empty. Then B picks e < φ(n), gcd(e, φ(n)) = 1 at random and computes d
such that ed ≡ 1(mod φ(n)), where φ denotes the Euler totient function. (It
can be computed by p, q.) Finally, it sends the common parameter params =
(n, e) and the master secret key msk = d to AII .
Query phase 1 AII adaptively issues H, H2, Public-Key-Request and
Private-Key-Request queries. B answers them in the following way:
– H query on ID: If a record (ID, hID, tID) appears in the H-List, B sends
hID to AI ; otherwise, B randomly chooses tID such that tID < φ(n),
gcd(tID, φ(n)) = 1, adds the record (ID, hID = gtID , tID) to H-List and
sends hID to AII .
– H2 query on ω: If a record (ω, k) appears in the H2-List, B sends k to
AI : otherwise, B picks k ∈ {0, 1}l at random, adds the record (ω, k) to
H2-List and sends k to AII .
– Public-Key-Request query on ID: B searches H-List for a record (ID,
hID, tID). Then, it picks coin ∈ {0, 1} at random such that Pr[coin = 0] =
ρ (ρ will be determined later). Finally, it randomly chooses xID ∈ Z∗n,
adds the record (ID,PKID = hd+xIDID · (ga)tID·coin = hd+a·coin+xIDID , SKID =
xID, coin) to KeyList and sends PKID to AII .
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– Private-Key-Extract query on ID: B searches KeyList for a record
(ID,PKID, SKID, coin). If coin = 0, it sends the SKID to AII ; otherwise,
it aborts and terminates.
Challenge AII submits two messages m0,m1 and an identity ID∗ with the
public key PKID∗ . B searches H-List for a record (ID∗, hID∗ , tID∗) and KeyList
for a record (ID∗,PKID∗ , SKID∗ = xID∗ , coin). If coin = 0, it aborts and
terminates; otherwise, B randomly chooses c∗2 ∈ {0, 1}l. Let r∗ = b, which is
unknown to B. Then B computes
c∗1 = (g
b)etID∗ = (gtID∗ )er
∗
= her
∗
ID∗ = H(ID
∗)er
∗
.
and sends c∗ = (c∗1, c
∗
2) to AII .
Query phase 2 AII makes a new sequence of queries, and B responds as in
Query phase 1.
Guess Finally, the adversary AII outputs a bit β′. B picks a tuple (ω, k) from
H2-List at random and outputs ω
dt
−1
ID∗
(gb)xID∗ as the solution to the CDH problem.
Note that, B knows p, q, so t−1ID∗ can be computed.
Probability Analysis: Let AskH∗2 denotes the event that PK
er∗
ID∗H(ID
∗)−r
∗
has
been queried to H2. Note that,
PKer
∗
ID∗H(ID
∗)−r
∗
= PKebID∗H(ID
∗)−b
= heb(d+a+xID∗ )ID∗ h
−b
ID∗
= heb(a+xID∗ )ID∗
= (gab)etID∗ (gb)etID∗xID∗ .
If the event AskH∗2 happens, then B will be able to solve the CDH problem by
choosing a tuple (ω, k) from the H2-List and computing ω
dt
−1
ID∗
(gb)xID∗ with the proba-
bility at least 1qH2 , where qH2 is the number of H2 queries by the adversary. If
the event AskH∗2 does not happen, B’s simulations are perfect and are identically
distributed as the real one form the construction.
We observe that the probability that B does not abort during the simulation
is given by ρqprv (1 − ρ) which is maximized at ρ = 1− 1/(qprv + 1). Hence, the
probability that B does not abort is at most 1τ(qprv+1) , where τ denotes the base
of the natural logarithm.
Now, the event AskH∗2|¬Abort denoted by Good, where Abort denotes the event
that B aborts during the simulation. If Good dose not happen, it is clear that
the adversary does not gain any advantage greater than 1/2 to guess β. Namely,
we have Pr[β′ = β|¬Good] ≤ 1/2. Hence, by splitting Pr[β′ = β], we obtain
|Pr[β′ = β]− 12 | ≤ 12Pr[Good]. To sum up, we have  > 2
′
qH2 τ(qprv+1)
.
Time Complexity. In the simulation, B’s overhead is dominated by the ex-
ponentiation computation in response to AII ’s H and Public-Key-Request
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query. So, we have t > t′ + tex(qH + qpub), where tex denotes the time for com-
puting exponentiation in Z∗n.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 2.
4 Conclusion
We have presented a new practical CL-PKE scheme that does not depend on the
paring. We have proven that our scheme is, in the random oracle model, secure
under the assumption that the RSA problem is intractable.
However, the model of our scheme is slightly weaker than the original model
[1]. It is still an open problem to design a CL-PKE scheme without paring in the
original model [1] that is IND-CCA secure, even relies on the random oracles.
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